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Defined Benefit Pension Reform: Reasons and Results
Daniel B. Klaff
In the face of corporate bankruptcies, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(“PBGC”) assures workers that their defined benefit pensions will be protected. It is
this fact which has motivated recent reform of the PBGC and the overarching defined
benefit plan system by Congress. This paper explores those reforms by addressing the
reasons for and results of the most recent reform which had as its primary aim
restoring the fiscal solvency of the PBGC. The paper challenges popular accounts of
the reform process while examining the results of such reform for important
stakeholders without resorting to an overly technical discussion of each provision of
the reform. The paper argues that while special interests were successful in obtaining
changes in the bill throughout the course of its legislative journey, focusing on such
small changes obscures important structural changes to the defined benefit pension
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent spate of corporate bankruptcies has raised many issues around the
country. Some bankruptcies, such as Enron’s, have been read as sobering tales of
corporate mismanagement and ineffective government regulation.1 Other bankruptcies,
such as those in the auto and airline industries, have been read as inevitable byproducts of
a new economic reality.2 Whatever the reason for these recent corporate bankruptcies,
workers around the country have shouldered a large portion of the consequences of these
corporate decisions. In the corporate restructuring that follows the declaration of
bankruptcy, workers have faced tremendous hardships. For unionized workers, many
union contracts have been terminated.3 Non-unionized workers do not lose as much
relative to previous contract-based entitlements but end up in the same position as
unionized workers because companies have few contractual obligations to non-unionized
workers. One of the few silver linings for workers faced with corporate bankruptcies
comes in the form of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), the federal
government’s insurance program for workers’ defined benefit pensions. While
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companies themselves are not required to honor pension promises in bankruptcy, the
PBGC, with limited exceptions, does guarantee those promises to workers.
However, as the number and size of bankruptcies have increased the system on
which workers in such circumstances rely has become increasingly unstable. It is in this
context, that recent efforts at reforming the PBGC and the underlying defined benefit
pension funding structure have emerged. After over three years since serious attempts at
reform began, a comprehensive looking reform bill has finally been passed. This article
evaluates this most recent reform of the pension system in light of the structure and
finances of the federal government’s pension insurance system. In this context, this
analysis demonstrates that the recent round of reform should be seen as making important
structural changes to the defined benefit pension system even though special interests did
succeed in watering down certain provisions.
Section I of the article provides a brief overview of the contemporary structural
design of the federal government’s defined benefit pension regulation system with a
particular focus on the PBGC. The first section also provides a detailed but brief
description of the financial circumstances facing the system in the period leading up to
recent reform. In contrast, Section II of the article focuses on the most recent rounds of
pension reform beginning in July of 2003. This section provides a brief procedural
overview of the recent reforms and then continues by describing the primary impetus for
such reform and evaluating its likely consequences in the context of the key stakeholders
affected by the reform process.
I. STRUCTURE AND FINANCES
In the context of an article primarily interested in the most recent round of
pension reform, it is important to provide some structural and financial background. This
article will not revisit previous work describing the history of the federal government’s
pension regulation system but will instead provide a broad overview of its relevant
details.4 After providing structural background, this section will then continue with an
explanation of the relevant accounting measures of the system as such measures (or at
least the intuition they represent) become a vital part in explaining the reasons for recent
pension reform.
A. Structure
In advance of describing the particulars of the structure of the pension reform, it is
important to keep in mind which pensions this legal system covers and which it does not.
The relevant laws in the area, as well as the PBGC, focus only on defined benefit pension
plans.5 Before the advent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
4
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(“ERISA”), there was no pre-funding requirement for employer pension plans.6 That is,
once an employer established a defined benefit pension plan, it was under no obligation
to make sure it had funds available to pay its employees when their pension obligations
were due. In 1974, President Gerald Ford signed ERISA, thereby enacting, amongst other
regulations, minimum funding standards to ensure a degree of pension plan prefunding
and a federal government guarantee for workers in the event of plan insolvency.7
The basis for ERISA’s funding rules is the requirement that all single employer
plans must hire an actuary to compute current pension plan costs.8 Essentially, the
relevant actuarial calculations reveal the yearly costs of current obligations to retirees and
any additional costs derived from past-service liabilities or previously unpaid yearly
costs. Along with such estimates of obligations, ERISA requires actuaries to report a “T
account” for the plan compared the yearly debits and credits associated with the plan.9
The initial system was very simple: if the credits (employer contributions to the plan)
were equal to the debits (yearly accrued plan costs) then the plan was in compliance with
the minimum funding rules.10
With minor modifications over time, these funding rules have led to a relatively
simple system. All plans have a funding standard account (“FSA”) such that if plan assets
equal the present value of liabilities then the FSA is 0.11 The FSA for each plan changes
each year based upon normal accrual of benefits, investment losses by the plan and
changes to the plan’s structure that increase liabilities (debits) as well as contributions by
employers, investment gains by the plan and changes to the plan’s structure that decrease
liabilities (credits).12 If the FSA is equal to or greater than 0 then no contributions are
required. Deficit reduction contributions (“DRCs”) are required when the value of the
assets of a plan compared to the value of its liabilities (the funding ratio) falls below 90
percent.13
While the previously discussed funding rules were designed to encourage
companies to prefund their pension obligations, ERISA also set up a system designed to
guarantee a certain level of benefits in the event of plan insolvency.14 Technically, the
PBGC, the cornerstone of this system, maintains two legally distinct programs: one for
single-employer plans and one for multi-employer plans.15 The PBGC spends most of its
6
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time on single-employer plans, which it insures, and much less time on multi-employer
plans to which it provides loans when necessary.16
The first component of the PBGC system is its termination structure. Initially,
ERISA allowed companies to opt-out whenever they wanted and hence transfer all of
their liabilities to the PBGC.17 In 1987, Congress revised this system to create three
potential mechanisms for plan termination, which are in place today. The standard
termination mechanism allows companies to voluntarily terminate their plans only if plan
assets exceed plan liabilities.18 The PBGC is thus not responsible for any of the
companies’ obligations under those plans.19 Distress termination is permitted if the
company meets one of three criteria: it is petitioning for bankruptcy or insolvency; it is
unable to pay its debts when due and will be unable to continue business without
termination; the cost of the plan has become unreasonably burdensome because of a
decline it the company’s workforce.20 Finally, the PBGC can force involuntary
terminations in certain circumstances.21
In order to fund the PBGC, ERISA initially required companies to pay a $1 perparticipant per-year premium (the basic premium).22 The basic premium was increased to
$19 per participant per year in 1991.23 The Pension Protection Act of 1987 added a
second tier premium (the variable premium) for plans with unfunded vested benefits that
was initially set at $6 for each $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits with a cap of $50.24 In
1994, Congress removed the cap and changed the variable requirement to $9 for each
$1,000 of unfunded vested benefits.25 If an employer does not meet its premium
obligations to the PBGC, the PBGC can place a lien on the employer’s assets.26
Aside from the premiums it collects from employers, the PBGC also acquires
assets from terminated plans. The premiums are on-budget revenues and must be invested
in fixed-income securities.27 On the other hand, terminated assets are part of the offbudget PBGC trust fund, which can be invested in a number of different areas.28 The
relationship between these PBGC and the federal budget can be seen in Figure 1. While
the PBGC itself is not backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government, it
does have a $100 million line of credit from the United States Treasury.29 Finally, it is
important to note that the PBGC does not pay out all employer provided benefits. Instead,
16
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it pays out almost all pension benefits anticipated by employer plans up to a maximum
amount that varies annually.30
B. Finances
While there have always been PBGC funding issues lurking, these issues began to
gain some degree of prominence in the early part of this decade. During the 1990s, strong
equity markets inflated the value of pension plan assets around the country and thus
reduced the required minimum contributions.31 Unfortunately, this meant that the
economic problems of the early 2000s reduced plan assets while at the same time
reducing the interest rates used for funding purposes causing massive underfunding in
plans across the country.32 This confluence of events has been dubbed the “perfect
storm”.33 As a result, the PBGC found itself facing a large number of underfunded plans
without the financial reserves necessary to provide relief should many of the plan
obligations end up on the PBGC’s doorstep.
Before discussing particular measures of the PBGC’s financial health, it is
important once again to note that all of these measures are based upon estimates done
before the most recent round of reform in an effort to frame the upcoming legislative
analysis. That is, these numbers represent what lawmakers and others were working from
during the relevant period. The primary vehicle used for measuring the health of the
PBGC has been cash flow accounting. The impetus for using cash flow accounting is that
it is the vehicle through which the entire federal budget is viewed. A cash flow model
compares the system’s annual receipts to its annual payments. In the case of the PBGC,
the receipts primarily include annual premiums and terminated assets and the payments
primarily include administrative expenses and benefits paid.
Past cash flow statements have indicated a recent decline in the fiscal position of
the PBGC, however, these statements have only hinted at the larger problem facing the
PBGC: declining revenue in the face of mounting expenses. Similar to Social Security,
the question was when, not if, the PBGC will begin running consistent cash flow deficits
and ultimately deplete its assets.34 The CBO projected that benefits paid will grow from
about $4 billion in 2005 to about $10 billion in 2015.35 According to these projections,
the PBGC would exhaust its on-budget surpluses around 2013 at which point the PBGC
would have to dramatically increase the amount of benefits it pays out from its trust fund
surpluses.36 While plan terminations increase the trust fund surpluses in the short-term,
this is a misleading indicator of the PBGC’s health because with those surpluses come
30
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larger future obligations. The starkest example of the change in overall fiscal health of
the PBGC’s on-budget funds comes from Figure 2, which shows a shrinking and
eventually non-existent surplus. In COFFI’s most recent model, overall PBGC funds run
out between 2020 and 2021.37
Putting the CBO and COFFI models together it was reasonable to expect that
under current law as of early 2006, the PBGC’s on-budget funds would have been
exhausted in about 2013 and that its off-budget funds would have been exhausted in
about 2020, leaving the PBGC itself in bankrupt and in need of a bailout.
Accrual accounting provides an alternative way of evaluating the financial health
of the PBGC.38 The essence of accrual accounting is evaluating the net financial position
of a system by comparing the system’s assets to the present value of its liabilities.39 In the
PBGC context, assets include the present value of all cash, equities, bonds and other
holdings in the on-budget revolving fund as well as the off-budget trust fund while
liabilities include the present value of all future benefits the PBGC is obligated to pay on
behalf of terminated plans, those pending termination and those likely to terminate.40 The
PBGC itself provides comprehensive accrual accounting for the entire system.41 Figure 3
reveals that the net financial position of the PBGC has declined rapidly in recent years
from its historical average. This change is primarily the result of the “perfect storm”
discussed above.42
While in some sense accrual accounting attempts to capture the future obligations
of the system, these methods do not focus primarily on mapping out the relevant future
assumptions necessary to get a full picture of the system’s long-term financial condition.
As a result, there have been a few efforts to model the long-term net financial position of
the PBGC system. The two major models in this area are the PBGC’s own model as well
as the CBO’s model. The PBGC model predicted $1.7 billion per year in additional
claims over the next ten years, which translates into a financial deficit of 26.9 billion in

37
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ttp://www.coffi.org/pubs/PBGC%20When%20Will%20the%20Cash%20Run%20Out%20v8.pdf . It also
focuses on a much longer time-horizon: 75 years. Id. at 1. However, the model is similar to CBO’s in that it
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Annual Report]. At bottom, this measure includes the costs from already terminated plans and those
probable near-term terminations, but excludes new claims likely to arise in the future. Cong. Budget Office,
The Risk Exposure of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 4 (2005), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6646/09-15-PBGC.pdf [hereinafter Risk Exposure].
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2014.43 Table 1 provides a summary of the CBO model’s results.44 Immediately upon
observing the data, it is clear that the model predicts a much worse financial position for
the PBGC than the PBGC’s own model: a deficit of $63.4 billion compared to $26.9
billion in 2014.45
II. Describing and Evaluating Recent Reform
This section of the article builds upon the structure and background of the pension
system in providing a nuanced account of recent reform. An important aim of this article
is to move beyond frequently simplistic popular understandings of the political dynamics
shaping the pension reform process as well as the overly complex financial estimates of
the effects of reform towards a meaningful picture of both the process and outcomes of
recent reform. In pursuing this objective, this section will provide a general overview of
the political process over the past three years as such an overview is necessary to
understand the reasons for the final outcome as well as to evaluate the success of various
participants in the reform process. The section will then add detail to this overview in
addressing the reasons for reform and assessing the outcomes of reform in the context of
key stakeholders.
A. Overview of Recent Reform
Partially as a result of the financial troubles illustrated above, PBGC reform
began to gain momentum in 2003. This section will provide a brief narrative of the
resulting round of reform, encompassed in two separate bills: the Pension Funding Equity
Act of 2004 (“Equity Act”) and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (“Protection Act”).
While these bills were passed as separate measures, it is possible to consider them as part
of one continuous reform effort.
The passage of the Equity Act reflected a scramble on the part of Congress and
the Administration to pass a stop-gap measure in the face of rising fiscal problems with
the PBGC. While the debate in some ways began with discussions of efforts at complete
43
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45
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issues, CBO assumes that the same ratio of current workers to retired workers exists in each pension plan
and hence that the increasing present value of vested benefits for workers as they near retirement offsets the
falling present value of benefits for retirees as they age. Along those lines, the CBO model also assumes a
constant number of participants and hence premium contributions over time. Id. at 24.
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reform, it soon became clear that Congress only had the political will and, to some extent,
the relevant ability to pass a temporary measure.
The Bush Administration kicked off serious legislative debate by releasing its
reform proposal on July 8, 2003.46 The proposal responded to the economic situation by
suggesting structural changes in the method of calculating plan liabilities as well as the
classification of “at-risk” plans. The proposal suggested changing the discount rate used
in calculating plan liabilities by replacing the 30-year Treasury bond rate with a yield
curve based upon investment grade corporate bonds.47 The Administration also proposed
defining “at-risk” plans as those plans that are attached to firms with a non-investment
grade credit rating and a funding ratio below 50 percent.48 If deemed “at-risk,” a plan
would be frozen such that it could not accrue new benefits, improve benefits, or provide
lump-sum payments to individuals wishing to exit the plan.49 The Administration’s plan
was primarily concerned with establishing funding requirements based upon a realistic
measurement of risk.
The House Ways and Means Committee was the first legislative committee to
tackle PBGC reform in the wake of the Administration’s proposal.50 The Ways and
Means Committee bill immediately centered the debate on short-term fixes for the
underfunding problem created by the “perfect storm” and away from the more systemic
changes based upon risk assessment offered by the Administration. The Committee bill
only recommended a temporary, three-year, requirement to use a yield curve based upon
investment grade corporate bonds.51
Almost two months after the House Ways and Means Committee passed a PBGC
reform bill and about a month before the full House would approve that bill, the Senate
Finance Committee, on September 17, 2003, passed its own version of PBGC reform.52
While also eschewing the “at-risk” plans issue, the bill did include the Administration’s
proposal for a permanent switch to a company specific yield curve.53 However, the
Finance Committee bill waived the requirement for deficit reduction contributions for
three years for plans that were not required to make a deficit reduction contribution in
2000.54 Such a measure constituted a broad exception that clearly attempted to cushion
the funding blow for those companies that were particularly hurt by the “perfect storm”.
46

Department of Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, The Administration Proposal to the Accuracy and
Transparency of Pension Information, July 8, 2003, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js529.htm [hereinafter 2004 Administration Proposal].
47
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Id.
50
Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776, 108th Cong. (2003) (as introduced
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52
National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act of 2004, S. 2424, 108th Cong. (2004) (as
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Id. at § 401.
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Id. at §406.
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On October 8, 2003 the full House, by a vote of 292-2, approved the Ways and
Means Committee’s bill with no relevant changes and thus only dealt with the discount
rate issue while ignoring the “at-risk” plans issue.55 The Senate Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions (HELP) Committee passed its own version of PBGC reform soon after, on
October 29, 2003.56 The HELP bill mirrored almost precisely the House bill.57
When the full Senate passed its version of the bill on January 28, 2004 by a vote
of 78 to 19, it was clearly inspired by the House bill as well as the Finance and HELP
bills but added its own take on the issue.58 The Senate bill did include the temporary
interest rate change contained in the House bill and also did not include any provisions
for “at-risk” companies.59 However, the Senate added a new facet to the debate by
altering the funding exception provided by the Finance Committee bill. The final Senate
bill allowed airline, steel and other companies that chose to apply, to waive 80 percent of
their deficit reduction contribution in the first-year and 60 percent in the second-year.60
Such language, not included in any previous versions of the bill, changed the tone of the
debate from one which dealt only at an abstract level with risk assessment and fixing the
underfunding problems generated by the “perfect storm” to one focused on the particulars
of the risks faced by different industries.
Facing such a shift in tone, the bill that emerged from conference committee and
was eventually signed by the President on April 10, 2004, represented a compromise
amongst provisions and principles.61 The compromise bill that became the final
incarnation of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 included the temporary, three year
requirement to use a yield curve based upon investment grade corporate bonds while
modifying the Senate’s funding exception.62 The exception combined the language
included in the Finance Committee bill with that included in the final Senate bill to
produce an exception for airline, steel, and other companies that chose to apply and were
not required to make deficit reduction contributions in 2000.63 The exemption
additionally allowed qualified companies to waive 80 percent of their deficit reduction
contributions in the first two years after the passage of the legislation.64
While President Bush did sign the legislation, the combination of provisions
present in the final Equity Act represented a significant departure from the risk principles
offered by the Administration less than a year earlier. The final bill took a much shorterterm view on the issues and was focused primarily on correcting the problems created by
the “perfect storm” on the early 2000s. The Pension Funding Equity Act clearly did not
address the long-term structural problems facing the PBGC and instead focused on the
short-term consequences of recent economic developments.

55

Pension Funding Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 3108, 108th Cong. (2003) (as introduced to the House, Sept.
17, 2003).
56
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The most recent round of PBGC reform demonstrated a more serious commitment
on the part of legislators to address the long-term problems facing the PBGC. Although
the financial viability of the PBGC clearly prompted the recent reforms, there was still
intense debate surrounding how best to restore the PBGC’s solvency while balancing the
needs of distressed industries and companies. After the passage of the Equity Act in
early 2004, the problems facing the PBGC only grew. Not only did the cash flow and
accrual accounting numbers generally continue in the wrong direction as shown earlier,
but it became clear that these problems were not temporary but were a result of long-term
structural issues.
The Bush Administration began the most recent PBGC reform when Secretary of
Labor, Elaine Chao, released the Administration’s reform proposal at a news conference
on January 10, 2005.65 As before, the Administration’s proposal set a benchmark for
reform by focusing on reducing the risk to the PBGC. Along those lines, the proposal
raised per-participant premiums to $30 and indexed such premiums to wage growth going
forward.66 Further, the proposal defined ongoing liabilities as the full present value of
obligations based upon an AA investment grade corporate bond yield curve.67 According
to the proposal, the Administration also sought to eliminate credit balances entirely so
that they would not reduce the payments required by pension plans.68 Credit balances
arise when a pension plan sponsor makes a contribution in one year that is higher than the
minimum required in that year. In an attempt to more closely match payments with
potential liabilities, the proposal defined “at-risk” plans as those that were attached to
non-investment grade rated firms.69 These provisions were clearly consistent with the
proposal’s overall theme of increasing plan contributions when at all possible and erring
on the side of PBGC financial viability as opposed to the needs of economically unstable
companies.
The House once again began the consideration of PBGC reform when the House
Education and Workforce Committee passed a bill on June 30, 2005.70 That bill included
many of the Administration’s ideas but scaled a number of them back in a way that
indicated reluctance to burden companies excessively. Importantly, the bill only restricted
the use of credit balances for those plans funded under 80 percent of liabilities and so
allowed most plans to continue to use credit balances to offset liabilities.71 In another
strong departure from the Administration’s proposal, the Committee’s bill defined “atrisk” plans as those plans funded at under 60 percent of liabilities.72
Less than a month after the House Education and Workforce Committee passed
its bill, on July 25, 2005, the Senate Finance Committee passed the Senate’s first version
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of the most recent PBGC reform.73 The Finance Committee presented a strong bill that
compromised away from the Administration’s principles in a few key areas. First, the bill
did not reduce in anyway the use of credit balances.74 In contrast, the bill took an even
stronger stance on the “at-risk” issue then that proposed by the Administration. The bill
defined an “at-risk” plan as one attached to a non-investment grade company or funded at
less than 50 percent of its liabilities.75 Furthermore, the bill placed benefit restrictions on
all “at-risk” plans such that “at-risk” plans could not increase benefits, offer lump-sum
payment or even accrue benefits, no matter their level of funding.76 Such strict provisions
must have been part of some kind of compromise because at the same time that the
Finance Committee’s bill reduced the amortization period to 7 years it created an
exception for airline companies, which allowed them to amortize their payments over 14
years.77 Amortization periods, which create a cushion for obtaining full funding, had been
set at as many as 30 years.
In contrast, the Senate’s Health Education, Labor and Pensions Committee passed
a bill on September 8, 2005 that was much more moderate on all provisions.78 For
example, the bill increased the per-participant premium to $30 but did not index
premiums to future wage growth.79 Additionally, the bill did not change the credit
balance system at all.80
The House Ways and Means Committee did not take up PBGC reform legislation
until November 9, 2005 — over four months after the Education and Workforce
Committee — when it passed its on version of the bill.81 The bill included an increase in
per-participant premiums to the $30 level but declined to index future increases to wage
growth.82 While mirroring the Education and Workforce language with respect to almost
all of the ongoing liabilities issues, including as applied to credit balances, the bill did
impose move severe penalties for plans which do not meet basic funding obligations.83 In
addition, the bill followed the Education and Workforce structure with reference to “atrisk” plans without imposing any additional benefit restrictions for “at-risk” plans
beyond the restrictions applied to all plans.84 In comparison to the Education and
Workforce bill and the Administration’s proposal, the Ways and Means Committee’s bill
took a shorter-term view by refusing to index per-participant premiums and further
relaxing the “at-risk” provisions pushed by the Administration.
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After the passage of bills by both the Finance and the HELP committees by early
September, the bill stalled in the Senate. The lag initially occurred because Senator
Grassley, the chairman of the Finance Committee, and Senator Enzi, the chairman of the
HELP committee, could not agree on what version of the pension bill to bring to the floor
of the Senate.85 However, by September 22, the Senators had agreed to bring a
compromise bill to the floor.86 Once the bill included credit rating provisions, Senators
DeWine and Mikulski put a hold on the legislation with the backing of business groups.87
The hold was not rescinded until November 10, 2005 when the bill was finally brought to
the full Senate for consideration.88
When the full Senate passed its version of the bill on November 16, 2005, almost
a month before the House would pass its own version of the bill, it represented a
compromise that departed significantly from the principles set forth by the
Administration.89 The bill did follow the lead of all of the other proposals by increasing
per-participant premiums to $30 but did not index premiums to future wage growth.90 In
terms of ongoing liabilities, the Senate bill required full funding of liabilities based on an
investment grade corporate bond curve.91 In a new twist, the Senate dealt with credit
balances by requiring them to be valued at market value.92 In terms of “at-risk” plans, the
Senate bill defined such plans as those attached to a non-investment grade firm and
funded at less than 93 percent of plan liabilities.93 However, the bill only required an
increase in “at-risk” plan liabilities to include possible termination costs and did not put
additional benefit restrictions on such plans.94 Following the HELP Committee’s lead, the
Senate bill reduced the amortization period to 7 years but allowed airlines to amortize
over 14 years.95
The final House bill passed 294-132 on December 15, 2005 closely resembled the
bill put forward by the powerful Ways and Means Committee.96 The only two differences
in the final bill were that it indexed per-participant premiums to wage growth and
allowed for an exception in contributions for interstate bus companies.97 While the final
House bill did not exactly resemble the Administration’s proposal, it increased the
financial solvency of the PBGC and the defined benefit pension plan system by creating
more realistic measures of plan liabilities.
In the midst of the PBGC reform debate, Congress dealt with a related bill, which
was produced out of the budget reconciliation procedures. While the specifics of the
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legislative process leading up the signing of the Deficit Reduction Act on February 9,
2006 do not merit much attention in this context, it is important to note the relationship of
the two bills.98 Since, as discussed above, the PBGC has a direct relationship to the
federal budget; it was encompassed in the budget reconciliation process. The result of
that process for the PBGC was to see per-participant premiums increase to $30 with
future premiums indexed to wage growth.99 While the discussions about the budgetary
effect of such provisions likely framed the discussions of some parts of the PBGC reform
debate, the provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act are superseded by any PBGC-specific
legislation signed after February 9, 2006.100
However, in the final analysis, the bill passed after conference by the House and
Senate did not change the premium increases put into place by the Deficit Reduction Act.
It was not until August 3, 2006 that the Senate finally passed its last version of pension
reform. The process initially took so long because House and Senate negotiators were at
odds over pension-related issues such as at-risk plans and credit balances.101 However,
the final few months of negotiations focused on somewhat unrelated issues such as the
estate tax and the extension of other tax provisions. 102 In the end, the House moved the
process forward by passing a pension bill devoid of other provisions and, in the end, the
Senate followed suit.103 While the President had threatened to veto any bill he believed
would not restore the solvency of the defined benefit pension system, he did sign the final
version of the Pension Protection Act passed by the House and Senate.104 The particulars
of the final bill will be discussed below in relation to the success and failure of various
stakeholders in the reform process. However, it is worth noting here that the centerpiece
of the bill, in accordance with almost all of the relevant proposals, was to increase the
funding requirements to 100 percent over the next 7 years.105
B. Reasons For and Results of Recent Reform
Mainly, popular accounts of the past three years of pension reform have focused
primarily on the effect of various interest groups in driving the reform process.106 Such a
depiction is only partially correct, as it focuses almost exclusively on the political and
procedural battles of the Congressional process while ignoring some of the structural
dynamics informing the reform process. In looking at these dynamics, this section of the
article will focus on the explanation for the particular process and results of reform while
also looking at what different stakeholders were able to achieve in the political process.
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This section argues that, as a group, special interests, were able to secure certain
preferential treatment in recent pension reform, but, in the larger context these changes
did not blunt the overall fiscal effect of reform.
As relevant PBGC reform legislation has moved through Congress there has been
a bitter and public battle on the part of interest groups to blunt certain aspects of such
reform. Generally, these groups, composed mainly of business and labor interests, have
tried to affect policy proposals that attempt to improve the financial health of the PBGC
and therefore to put a greater funding burden on pension plans. In essence, these special
interests have fought to reduce the premiums paid by employers for their pension plan
insurance.107
The effect of the business lobby on recent PBGC reform partially confirms the
popular account. The best single example of the effectiveness of the business lobby
comes from the decision by Senators DeWine and Mikulski to put a hold on the 2006 bill
in the Senate. While DeWine and Mikulski relented, they did so only with a promise of
being able to raise various business lobby complaints in conference.108 The business
lobby was particularly strong in pushing back on the credit rating issue because many
companies, such as General Motors, would fall into an “at-risk” category if junk bond
status guaranteed such a designation.109 In many ways, it is possible to argue that union
special interests were aligned with business special interests in a way that also helps
explain the gradual erosion of certain funding requirements over the course of the
legislative process. From the beginning, there were reports of unions aligning themselves
with business interests out of a desire to preserve pension plans.110 In a show of the unity
between labor and business on this issue, United Auto Workers President Alan Reuther
came out against the Administration’s proposal alongside representatives from the
Chamber of Commerce.111
In evaluating the validity of an interest group account of recent pension reform in
explaining the political dynamics surrounding PBGC reform, it is important to understand
business’s and labor’s reasons for wanting particular substantive changes in PBGC
legislation and the magnitude of the changes they were able to secure. The yield curve
component of PBGC reform was designed to assess a plan’s risk based upon the specifics
of each individual company. This approach was less concerned with merely reducing
underfunding than with establishing funding requirements based upon a realistic
measurement of risk. As the debate deepened in the second round of reform, critics of
using bond yields became concerned that bond rates would prove inappropriate because
bonds are tied to particular end dates while pensions have no particular expiration date.
Such criticism of the use of bond rates faded in PBGC reform as there was consensus
among the various proposals in each round of reform that a continued use of 30-year
Treasury rates was unacceptable. Yield curve bond rates track Treasury rates but are
systematically lower and thus increase the amount of funding required on the part of
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pension plans. While business lobbies succeeded in limiting the move from Treasury
rates to yield curves to a temporary one in the first round of reform, they were unable to
do so in the second round of reform as the economic circumstances created a consensus
in favor of a permanent change.112
In addition to arguments over whether or not to use bond yields at all, the debate
progressed to include the question of what type of bond yields to utilize. While the first
round of reform had used high-quality investment grade or “non-junk” bonds, there was a
move in the second round of reform by some to focus only on bonds with AA ratings or
better. Those in favor of a higher standard argued that using better quality bonds would
hold plans to a higher funding standard, which would match the importance of pension
obligations. Business lobbies argued that a higher standard of bonds would increase
contribution requirements and risk harming companies and their plans. In the end,
business groups were able to limit the yield curves used to include investment grade
corporate bonds and not just AA or better corporate bonds.113
With another complexity of estimating ongoing liabilities, a debate arose over the
issue of smoothing periods. A smoothing period is the amount of time over which
discount rates are averaged. Many agued for reducing the smoothing period to 4 years so
as to more realistically reflect plan liabilities based upon the most current market
conditions. Opponents of such a reduction in the smoothing period argued that pensions
are in fact long-term obligations and so changes in funding requirements should not be
subject to such short-term market fluctuations. This claim was tied to the idea that such
fluctuations risked hurting businesses. Lobbyists succeeded in fending off the desire of
some to eliminate the smoothing period entirely.114
One of the biggest areas of contention, also related to calculating ongoing
liabilities, was the use of credit balances. Under ERISA rules, credit balances were
carried by plans from year to year based upon an assumed interest rate even if the assets
that had been purchased with the additional pension funding had declined. Those arguing
for the elimination or restriction of credit balances claimed that allowing such credit
when the value of the actual assets had declined distorted the funding ratio of any given
plan. Those in favor of maintaining credit balances argued that companies should be
encouraged to make greater than the minimum required contributions and therefore be
rewarded for doing so. Maintaining credit balances was one of the main issues that
caused Senators DeWine and Milkuski to put a hold on the Senate bill and was very
important to business lobbyists because credit balances reduced the amount of present
funding obligations on the part of companies. Ultimately, credit balances were restricted
but not eliminated.115
112

Congress chose a simplified version of the yield curve which created three separate categories to be
applied depending on when the obligation was due: 1-5 years, 6-20 years, and the remaining period.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. (2006) (as passed by the House, July 28, 2006) at §
102(h)(2)(C).
113
Id. at § 102(h)(2)(D).
114
Congress reduced the smoothing period to two years. Id.
115
Congress eliminated double counting of credit balances by preventing credit balances from being
applied to the underfunding calculation and the contribution calculation. Id. at § 102(f). Additionally,
Congress agreed to index credit balances to actual returns and not assume a specific interest rate without
reference to current market conditions. Id. Credit balances can be used to substitute for cash contributions if
the plan is funded above the 80 percent level without including previous credit balances. Id.

16
The second set of major issues dealt with in the PBGC reform debate was whether
or not to create a separate category for “at-risk” plans and how to define such plans.
Designating plans as “at-risk” would provide a longer-term solution to some of the
PBGC’s problems by requiring plans that were more likely to be in financial difficulty to
make larger contributions to their plans. Creating such “at-risk” status raised a good deal
of controversy because big business argued that requiring additional payments from the
most financially vulnerable companies risked pushing those companies over the edge or,
at a minimum, causing them to exit from the defined benefit system.
While there were still arguments over whether or not any “at-risk” category was
acceptable because of potential negative effects on already unsound plans when the
second round of PBGC reform began, the major definitional question concerned the use
of credit ratings in determining “at-risk” plans. Some argued that a plan should be
defined as “at-risk” if the company attached to the plan had a non-investment grade credit
rating. The proponents of such a rule claimed that while such a rating is not tied in any
specific way to the funding status of a plan, empirically a bad credit rating is a good
measure of such high-risk plans. Business arguments against the use of credit rating
included the minimal direct relevance of credit ratings to the funding status of a plan as
well as the fact that not all firms are rated. These arguments caused some to advocate for
an “at-risk” definition that focused at least in part on funding status. However, in
advancing a stronger argument against the use of credit ratings, some claimed that the
potential economic problems of creating an “at-risk” definition would be exacerbated by
the use of credit ratings. This group argued that credit ratings would penalize companies
in cyclical industries as such companies are likely to have poor credit ratings at precisely
the times that they are most economically vulnerable. The conference committee dropped
references to non-investment grade status in the definition of “at-risk”: a big win for
business and labor lobbyists.116
One remaining issue involved the question of what to do when a plan was not
fully funded. Similar to situations where new benefits are introduced, it does not make
sense to penalize plans for immediate rule changes or the short-term market fluctuations
that decrease a plan’s assets as pension obligations are long-term obligations.
Amortization periods provide plans a number of years, traditionally as many as 30, to
fully fund obligations created in any given year. Those arguing for a substantially
reduced amortization period claimed that longer periods functionally do not require
underfunded plans to make up the difference in plan funding before their plans are likely
to terminate. On the other side, those in favor of allowing economically troubled
companies to maintain liquidity argued that if funding rules were to be strengthened, it
was important that companies have a long time to make up such shortfalls so as to
maintain liquidity. In the end, the amortization period was reduced to seven years: a
number which was likely a reasonable compromise besides the different positions.
A final area involved the politically contentious issue of whether or not to create
funding exceptions for certain industries or particular companies. In many ways, the
intuitions surrounding such measures are the opposite of those surrounding the “at-risk”
debate. The reason raised for giving particular exceptions to different industries or
companies was that those industries or companies were particularly financially vulnerable
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and so requiring full deficit reduction contributions risked pushing those companies over
the edge or causing those plans to exit the system. The argument on the opposite side was
twofold. First, there was a simple question of where to draw the line on which industries
or companies should be excepted and in addition there was the argument that such
vulnerable companies are precisely the ones that should be required to pay the full
contribution because they are at a greater risk of default. In particular, the airline lobby
was effective in achieving gains in the recent PBGC reform process. In the 2004 reform
bill, airlines were the primary force behind the funding relief section, which was
expanded to cover all businesses.117 The best bill the airlines were able to achieve came
in the form of the Senate Employee Pension Preservation Act, which gave airlines a 25
year amortization period and raised the interest rate assumptions.118 While that bill never
passed, it is not hard to imagine that the power of business and labor lobbies in the Senate
participated in the compromises in the final Senate bill which blunted the “at-risk”
definition by requiring funding at less than 93 percent. In the Senate bill, airlines were
also able to achieve a specific 14-year amortization exception. In the final bill, airlines
with frozen plans were given a 17-year amortization period while other airlines were held
to the same 7-year period as other companies.119
A common thread running throughout this discussion of the rationale behind the
business and labor lobbies’ position in PBGC reform is the implicit assumption that
placing additional pressure on companies (to the point of causing them to go bankrupt)
should be avoided. In response to this argument, many have simply declared that if these
companies are overly fragile perhaps they should reorganize in bankruptcy. Those
arguments were made in the context of pending accounting rule changes. When the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) announced new rules in early 2006 to
take effect at the end of 2006, the announcement only heightened corporate fears
regarding the effect of requiring increased contributions to the PBGC on corporate
balance sheets. These rule changes, which are designed to require companies to more
accurately reflect their obligations, mandate that companies add their pension obligations
to their financial balance sheet.120 Some have claimed that these changes could decrease
shareholder equity by about 10 percent in the largest 1,000 firms.121 While others have
pointed out that these numbers are already included in fiscal reports and that the rule only
mandates mandating a change in the placement of the information, it is clear that
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companies view FASB’s pending rule changes as threatening their financial positions.122
Regardless of where one stands on these particular arguments, all concerned came to an
agreement that creating more certainty through reform will at least allow companies to
better plan for their future pension obligations.123
While initially convincing, there are reasons to suggest that business and union
lobbyists did not play as big of a role in the reform process as one might predict based
upon traditional political science theory. To adequately address the impact of such
lobbying groups, it is important to take a step back and realize the context of their efforts.
To be sure, any business with a pension plan would have initially decried almost every
element of the Administration’s reform proposal in each round of reform. In that context,
while it can be said that lobbyists won some gains for their clients, it is unclear that they
altered the character of the reform fundamentally. For example, in the first round of
PBGC reform, businesses initially came out against all of the particular provisions of the
Administration’s proposal, including those changing the interest rate, but later backed off
and focused their efforts on the funding relief provisions.124
The most obvious and important example of the failure of interest groups in
changing the context of the PBGC reform debate involved the raising of per-participant
premiums. It was widely recognized that because these premiums had not been raised
since 1991, some increase was necessary. While there was relatively little disagreement
about the amount by which such premiums should be raised immediately, there was some
question about how to deal with premiums going forward. In particular, the question was
whether or not to index premium increases to wage growth. Increasing the base premium
provided legislators with the easiest and most effective way of increasing the PBGC’s
financial position by increasing its revenue base. This was the best method of increasing
the PBGC’s financial position precisely because it required the most from employers. In
essence, a rise in premium constituted a tax increase on employers. After all, such money
does not go into funding employers’ own plans but is counted as on-budget revenue in
the overall federal budget. In the end, the increase to $30 per participant indexed to wage
growth in the Deficit Reduction Act was left unchanged and is now law.
Also, estimates of the effectiveness of the different versions of the most recent
round of PBGC reform point to the fact that the provisions that special interests have
been focused on did not make a large difference in the context of overall PBGC fiscal
reform. First, COFFI estimates indicate that there is not a significant difference between
reform proposals in terms of the ultimate reduction in the long-term deficit facing the
PBGC. COFFI estimates that the Administration’s proposal would reduce the price of a
bailout from $92 billion to $45 billion, the House bill would reduce the price of a bailout
to $49 billion and the Senate bill would have a comparable outcome as the House bill.125
In the context of the CBO’s 20-year prediction of a $91 billion deficit or COFFI’s 20year prediction of a $62 billion deficit, the $5 billion difference between the
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Administration’s initial proposal and the Congressional bills is not altogether convincing
evidence that interest groups are driving the process. That is, because these reductions in
payout necessarily come from greater funding on the part of businesses, interest groups
may be making a small difference once a the larger debate is framed, but they certainly
are not in control of the entire policy discussion.
While the primary vehicle for such reductions in the price of a PBGC bailout
comes from increases in premiums, further evidence of the limited effect of lobbying
comes from the effect of changes in contribution requirements. The PBGC estimates that
the Administration’s proposals would generate $1,000 billion in contributions over the
next ten years or 110 percent of what previous law would have provided.126 By
comparison, the PBGC estimates that both the House and Senate bills would lead to
about $843 billion in funding over the next ten years which would be 92 percent of the
funding that would have been provided by previous law.127 One might read these
numbers as an example of the effect of business lobbies in reducing required
contributions from those originally required by the Administration. While this claim is
true to a limited degree, a notable difference relates to the different transition periods
assumed in each proposal, something which lobbyists have not paid much attention to, at
least in public, and which only creates such a large difference because of the shorter, 10year window, assumed by the PBGC estimates.128 Looking beyond the absolute numbers
and towards the similarities in the estimates of the effects of the House and Senate bills, it
becomes clear that the industry specific provisions included in the Senate bill and not in
the House bill, which have been the subject of much debate, cannot be making a very
large difference in the ultimate amount of contributions required by the system.
In addition to the fact that the magnitude of the interest group effect is not as large
as initially predicted, the interest group explanation of PBGC reform can also be placed
into question with a more complex account of the divisions amongst labor groups. While
the traditional account would indicate that the there are no immediate benefits to be had
by supporting the PBGC’s long-term fiscal solvency, it seems that at least some members
of the labor movement did not see it that way. In reality, some parts of the labor
movement focused on the long-run fiscal stability of the PBGC by advocating increased
funding.129 That the reason for this split in the labor ranks is not entirely clear, however,
there are a few possible explanations. Most likely, the split mirrors the disputes that occur
over renegotiating contracts when companies face bankruptcy in that harsher funding
requirements – which are similar to giving back collective bargaining gains because they
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reduce the amount of benefits employees are likely to be offered and accrue – tradeoff
with long-term fiscal solvency of the plans and the PBGC – which are similar to allowing
a company to stay out of bankruptcy. In this particular context, part of the pressure to
accept reform may come from the fact that unions recognize that they have been part of
the problem by accepting improved benefit formulas from financially shaky
employers.130 Finally, one reason for this split may be derived from the fact that higher
wage earners lose more when plans are funded by the PBGC because of the PBGC cap on
annuities, which may incline those workers toward supporting stricter plan solvency
requirements.131
In addition to investigating divisions amongst labor groups, it is also important to
look at potentially important divisions among businesses. While most of this discussion
and certainly that in the popular press, has focused on business interest as a single factor,
there is reason to suspect that different groups of businesses might have diverged in their
objectives in recent PBGC reform. The two potentially divergent groups include those
with underfunded plans and those with fully funded plans. These groups are likely to
pose a united front against the PBGC premium portion of recent reform as such increases
create new obligations for all businesses each year. However, in the area of funding
reform, these two groups should diverge in their positions. Businesses with underfunded
pension plans, as has been widely reported, clearly do not want increased funding rules as
they increase obligations on the business. However, businesses with already funded plans
do not see such funding rules as creating a burden because having a fully funded pension
plan means that increased funding restriction generally affect such businesses. However,
increased funding rules have the virtue of forcing underfuned businesses to increase
solvency of the overall system as well as individual plans in a way that causes less plans
to put obligations on the PBGC which are ultimately funded by funded plans. This is true
because when underfuned plans leave the PBGC with increased obligations, the PBGC or
the federal government will have to pay for such obligations with tax increases in the
form of premium increases or increases in general taxes: both of which will negatively
affect fully funded businesses.
In supplementing the popular account discussed above and in trying to provide
greater insight into PBGC reform, the rest of this section presents an explanation of how
such legislation was passed. This discussion of the practical reality of PBGC reform will
attempt to explain how this legislation was passed by focusing on what raised the
possibility of reform and what allowed such reform to be completed.
In many ways, concepts such as “policy window” and “policy entrepreneur”
provide a useful point of departure for such an explanation of PBGC reform.132 The
“perfect storm” of the early 2000s and the resulting effects on pension plans and the
PBGC created the necessary policy window. While the “perfect storm” got the ball
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rolling, airline bankruptcies, and especially United’s bankruptcy, quickened the pace of
reform. As the PBGC began to report declining numbers over the course of the relevant
period and airline bankruptcies became prominent, tremendous momentum for reform
was generated.133
During the PBGC reform discussions in 2001, the debate centered on how much
to reduce premiums and how much to increase the burden placed on the PBGC.134 In
many ways, the issue of PBGC reform was raised initially in 2003 precisely because
circumstances had changed so dramatically. As the earlier discussion indicates, by 2002,
the PBGC was beginning to face the prospect of long-term financial trouble. By 2003, the
Government Accountability Office had declared the PBGC itself “high risk”.135
The crisis that generated this policy window largely framed the debate on the
financial status of the PBGC and made certain portions of the Administration’s proposals,
which reflected a financial management view, uncontroversial among lawmakers.
However, as was pointed out above, it would be a mistake to believe provisions such as
that which raised the per-participant premium to $30 were uncontroversial in the business
and labor community. It was in this larger context that divisions within Congress and
between parties grew over smaller issues on which interest groups were able to carry
weight.136
While this basic analysis points to the importance of the financial context
surrounding the PBGC in motivating reform, in order to more fully explain why and how
that context shaped the actual reform debate it is necessary to delve deeper into the
particular ways in which the crisis was framed. To begin, the combination of declining
balance sheets and long-term structural problems led many participants and observers of
the legislative process to invoke the specter of the Savings and Loan crisis of the
1980s.137 These individuals claimed that the PBGC would soon face a situation in which
it could not pay for the benefits it had guaranteed and would therefore require a massive
government bailout. One prominent think tank noted that if nothing were done to restore
the system, such a rescue would cost taxpayers $92 billion.138
In response to the Savings and Loan image, many cautioned that such a
comparison was unwarranted. The first reason to exercise some cautious optimism was
that defined benefit plans had been resilient of the course of time and had faced issues of
underfunding in the past.139 Along those lines, many still focused on the effect of the
“perfect storm” in creating the underfunding crisis and so cautioned that the current
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financial problems could easily be over-stated as an indication of long-term structural
problems with the PBGC.140 Finally, even if the Savings and Loan comparison was
appropriate, many pointed out that the timeframe for such a collapse was at least a decade
away and so there was plenty of time to confront the issue. Therefore, reform should not
be rushed simply for the sake of staving off a Savings and Loan style bailout.141
Although the Savings and Loan comparison was doubtlessly over-stated by many,
it would be naïve to claim that the system did not face serious challenges. While it was
mostly as a result of the “perfect storm,” the PBGC $7.7 billion surplus of 2001 had
become a $23.3 billion deficit by the end of 2004.142 Additionally, while some also
pointed to the decline of the importance of defined benefit plans, more generally that did
not mean that many individuals did not rely on those plans and that a failure of the PBGC
to pay out benefits would not risk undermining many crucial sectors of the economy.
While the general economics facing the PBGC in early 2004 certainly raised
many eyebrows in Washington and around the country, in some ways it was the domino
effect portended by the problems facing the airline industry that really motivated the most
recent PBGC reform debate As a result of the emerging number of corporate
bankruptcies that were resulting in terminated defined benefit pension plans, there was a
threat of a domino effect that could cripple the entire system.143 The clear competitive
advantage gained by one company by removing its pension plan from its books seemed to
be driving industry competitors to declare bankruptcy and shed their own defined benefit
plans. While most of these declarations were legitimate there was a fear, motivated by a
few instances of curious accounting practices, that more and more companies in all
sectors of the economy would view declaring bankruptcy and getting rid of pension
obligations as an important component of economic strategy.144
Since the airline industry would prove such a crucial motivator of the most recent
round of PBGC reform, it is useful to take a closer look at the effect of these bankruptcies
on the PBGC. Since 2000, Delta Airlines, Northwest, United, and US Airways, which
represented 40 percent of domestic seating capacity, have all gone bankrupt.145 Twentytwo of the 162 airline bankruptcies that have occurred since deregulation in 1978, have
occurred in the last 5 years.146 At the time of its plan termination in May of 2005, United
pensions were underfunded by $9.8 billion.147 Even with United and US Airways having
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shed their pensions, the rest of the airline industry pension plans remain underfunded by
$13.7 billion.148
Of course, the major economic and ultimately political debate centers on how the
blame should be apportioned for the situation facing airlines. If the airlines are without
fault or the “perfect storm” is the reason for such underfunding then proposals which
except airlines from certain funding requirements might be worthwhile as a method of
enhancing industry-wide liquidity and allowing the companies and their pension plans to
survive. Without reform, the airline industry owed $10.4 billion in contributions over the
next four years.149 On the other hand, if the airlines themselves are mostly to blame then
they do not deserve any funding exceptions because such exceptions would continue to
reward airlines for their failure to account for their promises to workers in the form of
defined benefit pension plans.
While no one knows for sure who or what is to blame for the airline industry’s
current problems, there are some basic facts that point toward the industry playing at least
some substantial role in the problems facing the industry’s pension plans if not for the
problems facing the industry’s underlying economic structure. During the profitable years
of 1997-2002, airlines dramatically underfunded their pension plans.150 Additionally, it is
the structure of the airline industry, which includes high fixed costs, cyclical demand and
intense competition, and not pension plans, which are responsible for the overall
economic problems facing the industry.151 Finally, it is far from clear and probably
unlikely that restricting airlines’ liquidity would make them more likely to enter
bankruptcy.152
Despite the availability of such a policy window explanation, it is important to
note that the existence of such a window does not guarantee the passage of reform. In the
PBGC case, the question of what generates actual reform once a policy window is created
is particularly interesting because the recent trends have been against increases in
regulation and forms of taxation both of which PBGC reform bucked. PBGC reform was
certainly not guaranteed: it almost died in the House because the Chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, Bill Thomas, initially wanted to include PBGC reform as part of a
larger Social Security and retirement policy reform bill.153 Of course, such a bill would
have been doomed to failure because of the controversial nature of Social Security
reform.154 This example points out two important qualifications on the importance of
policy windows. First, the momentum built by a crisis and the possibility of a policy
window can be squandered by small, and largely procedural, decisions. Second, and more
importantly, such a window by itself is not enough as evidenced by the failure of Social
Security reform.
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While the final analysis of what went wrong in Social Security reform must be
left to historians, in answering the question of how one capitalizes on the momentum
created by a policy window, it is useful to pause to focus on Social Security reform and
compare it to PBGC reform. First, the PBGC faced a similar issue to that facing the
Social Security system as the shrinking workforce meant that fewer and fewer workers
were becoming the base for funding the benefits of a larger and larger beneficiary
population.155 However, the problems facing the PBGC were worse than those facing
Social Security because the exiting of plans from the defined benefit system further
reduced the funding base.156 One reason for distinguishing between the two is related to
the simple magnitude of the issue both in actual program size and in public knowledge.
Since Social Security is a much larger program along both of these dimensions, it may
well be that it was harder for interest groups to mobilize the support necessary to defeat
PBGC reform. Similarly, interest groups in the Social Security context are generally
larger, more organized, and more powerful. This may also explain why unorthodox
legislative measures like a commission were necessary for earlier instances of Social
Security reform and not for PBGC reform. There also seems to have been less of an
initial consensus on the existence of a crisis in the Social Security context than there was
in the most recent round of PBGC reform. If this reflects a reality that the PBGC was in
greater crisis than Social Security at the time of recent reform then the policy window
theory is only bolstered.
Also, the crisis facing the PBGC was concretized in two ways that the crisis
facing Social Security never was. First, the US Airways and United bankruptcies that
occurred during the initial phases of PBGC reform reinforced the problems facing the
PBGC demonstrated the impact of pension plan problems in a way that nothing did for
Social Security. Furthermore, these and other bankruptcies concretized pension plans’
problems for workers. While, as with Social Security, such promises had yet to come due,
in many ways living through their employers’ bankruptcy forced workers to confront the
situation of their pension plans as well as that of the PBGC. Lawmakers thinking along
these lines might have therefore prioritized a desire to avoid blame for the loss of future
benefits since there was very little credit to be taken. One might think that workers would
also have perceived their Social Security benefits as in jeopardy when the Social Security
crisis was publicized. However, newspaper articles are not the same as experience via
corporate bankruptcy and many people already did not expect Social Security to continue
to exist but certainly believed their pensions, which they believed they were directly
accumulating via their employers, would exist upon their. Beyond all of that, there is a
question of whether or not the problems facing Social Security were even publicized in a
way that made people believe their benefits were threatened since so much of the
discussion surrounding Social Security reform focused on the possibility of private
accounts. Finally, one might read Social Security as a further cautionary tale
demonstrating that even when a policy window is created; it is possible for reform to get
bogged down as the result of the specifics of the reform and perhaps the leverage of
interest groups.
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One particular way of making reform failures such as Social Security reform less
likely comes from the work of a strong policy entrepreneur. In the original ERISA
context, there were a number, including Senator Javitz.157 In the context of recent PBGC
reform, there are two likely candidates for such a distinction. The first is President Bush
or the Administration broadly speaking. The President through the Secretary of Labor,
Elaine Chao, and Bradley Belt, the now former head of the PBGC, strongly pressed a
reform agenda driven by the idea of PBGC solvency. While important, such
Administration support for particular agenda items is not without precedent and not
without failure: witness Social Security reform. In the PBGC reform drama
Representative, and now majority leader, Boehner played the role of an additional policy
entrepreneur. In addition to pushing reform through the House Education and Workforce
Committee when he chaired that committee, Boehner was an outspoken supporter of
serious reform from the beginning and continued to be so when he took over the job of
majority leader of the House.158 While Boehner’s ascendancy was fortuitous for PBGC
reform, his continued support of reform played a crucial role in taking it from a wellpositioned idea to a reality.
While Congress did not need to resort to use of more traditional forms of
unorthodox processes, such as commissions or summits, PBGC reform did make use of
some untraditional and rule-like mechanisms. The primary example of this comes from
the budget reconciliation process that took place at the same time as the most recent
round of PBGC reform. As discussed above, the PBGC has a complicated relationship to
the federal budget in that it is a net cash-flow positive in the short-term because of its
collection of premiums but is a long-term actuarial liability.159 Because the budget
reconciliation process creates such pressure on legislators to agree to policy changes, it
provided a great place to concretize one of the most important components of PBGC
reform: premium increases. In fact, the pressure to reconcile the budget was so great as to
cause the HELP Committee to increase premiums above $45 per-participant despite the
fact that the Committee’s PBGC reform legislation only raised premiums to $30 perparticipant.160 In any event, the ultimate Deficit Reduction Act cemented an increase to
$30 per-participant indexed to wage growth. While such a provision was specifically
designated as temporary pending any new PBGC reform legislation, the budget
reconciliation process provided a baseline ahead of Conference Committee negotiations
and also guaranteed such premium increases in the event that no PBGC reform legislation
was ultimately passed. In this way, the budget reconciliation process contextualized the
fight over premium increases in terms of strict budgetary rules, which made it harder for
interest groups to exert leverage.
While in some sense laying the groundwork for a PBGC reform consensus, there
is a question of whether or not such budget reconciliation measures with respect to the
PBGC should be encouraged. The answer is generally “no” but in this situation “yes.” In
general, using the PBGC as a short-term revenue source is dangerous because it shows a
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positive cash-flow to the federal budget when in fact it is a long-term liability. In some
sense, this makes the PBGC’s premiums a yearly revenue generator for the federal budget
when those premiums are meant conceptually to finance future benefit payments. For
example, the 2004 federal budget credited the PBGC with a net cash surplus of $247
million even though it assumed more than $3 billion in new liabilities as the result of a
number of airline bankruptcies.161 This tendency can be explained with reference to the
most recent budget reconciliation bill where PBGC pension reform was estimated as a net
saving of $4.1 billion over 10 years.162 While even during the current round of PBGC
reform such budget antics should not be lauded, they can be justified from a long-term
budgetary perspective because of the importance of setting the presumption in favor of a
core component of PBGC reform.
The relationship between PBGC reform and theories of unified government are
particularly complex. The Congress within which the most recent round of PBGC reform
took place failed to get much legislation passed. That overall trend points against the
importance of unified government in aiding legislation because throughout the period
Republicans have controlled both houses and the Presidency. However, PBGC reform
provides an example of where unified government may have been useful in aiding
reform. First, the alliance between the President and Representative Boehner, who led the
House majority through much of the legislative process, provides evidence that such an
alliance can be helpful. In many ways, the bipartisan and general Washington consensus
about the crisis facing the PBGC generated most of the substantive context for the debate.
Similar to the interest group theory, unified government did break down when the
legislation entered more specific discussions over less consequential provisions. It is clear
from the testimony of the Secretary of Labor, the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office, and the Director of the PBGC, that the Administration felt that Congress watered
down PBGC reform over time.163 In the end, it was the Senate in particular that angered
the Administration and those in favor of a financial management perspective by allowing
airlines and other businesses a number of exceptions. Once again, the PBGC reform story
questions the importance of a political science explanation for legislative reform, in this
case the theory of unified government, by pointing out that such a theory has some force
in explaining during the particulars of the legislative process but does not frame the entire
substantive debate.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Popular accounts of the pension reform process have consistently focused on the
legislative maneuvers of various interest groups. Such a focus lacks a depth of
explanation required by those interested in understanding the effect of such legislation on
key stakeholders. By focusing on the structural changes in recent reform, this analysis
highlights the relative ineffectiveness of major lobbyists in achieving their stated goals as
well as the effect of recent reform on other components of the federal budget. In
particular, the change in per-participant PBGC premiums marks a serious change in the
PBCG finances which dwarfs small changes in funding requirements for various
companies in fiscal important. In that light, the paper should be read as pushing popular
accounts to expand their scope of inquiry beyond the legislative process and to focus on
the overall goals and substance of reform in evaluating the effects of interest groups and
other actors on such reform efforts. The goal of this article is not to convince readers that
the most recent round of reform has been a total success from the standpoint of fiscal
solvency. It does, however, seek to paint a clearer picture of the recent round of pension
reform so that the effects of such reform for individual stakeholders can be more clearly
understood.
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Figure 1
The Budgetary Treatment of the PBGC
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Figure 2
Historical Data and CBO Model
PBGC’s On-Budget Assets, 1995-2015
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Figure 3
PBGC’s Overall Net Position, 1985-2004
(Billions of Dollars)165
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Table 1
CBO Long-Term Net Position Model
PBGC Prospective Net Costs for Single-Employer Plans
(Billions of Dollars)166
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